The North American Free Trade Agreemetn: Looking at the Binational Panel System Through the Lens of Free Enterpresie Fund by Garman, John J. & Bell, Matthew K.
Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business
Volume 10 | Issue 4 Article 4
2011
The North American Free Trade Agreemetn:
Looking at the Binational Panel System Through
the Lens of Free Enterpresie Fund
John J. Garman
Faulkner University Jones School of Law
Matthew K. Bell
Ernst & Young LLP
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
John J. Garman & Matthew K. Bell, The North American Free Trade Agreemetn: Looking at the Binational Panel System Through the Lens
of Free Enterpresie Fund, 10 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 525 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global/vol10/iss4/4
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: LOOKING AT THE BINATIONAL
PANEL SYSTEM THROUGH THE LENS OF
FREE ENTERPRISE FUND
By John J. Garman1 and Matthew K. Bell2
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the constitutionality of the binational
panels of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) under
the United States Constitution.  Part I provides an overview of the
binational panel process.  Part II outlines the process for challenging
the constitutionality of binational panels and the obstacles that must
be overcome.  Part III discusses possible violations of the Due Process
Clause.  Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of binational panels
under Article II of the United States Constitution.  Part V examines
the constitutional implications of Article III with respect to the  ab-
sence of judicial review.  Part VI is a case-by-case analysis of previous
attempts to challenge the constitutionality of binational panels.  The
conclusion  illustrates how binational panels may violate Article II, Ar-
ticle III, and the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment.
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA allows each party to reserve “the
right to apply its antidumping . . . and countervailing duty law to
goods imported from the territory of the other Party.”3  Antidumping
laws prevent companies from selling products in other countries at un-
reasonably low prices.  Countervailing duty laws are a means to the
same end, but are in place to offset government subsidies.  In the
United States, a domestic firm can ask the Commerce Department to
investigate a potential violation of either antidumping or counter-
vailing duty actions.4  The Commerce Department and the Interna-
1 John J. Garman, professor of law, Faulkner University Jones School of Law.
J.D. Vanderbilt University, LL.M. Universite´ de Droit, d’Economie et des Sciences
d’Aix-Marseille.
2 Senior Associate in the Customs and International Trade Practice at Ernst &
Young LLP.  J.D. Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law; LL.M.
International Law, The John Marshall Law School.  The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Ernst &
Young LLP.
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1902(1), Dec. 17,
1992. 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
4 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1930).
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tional Trade Commission then make a preliminary determination.5  If
both agencies make affirmative findings, they then make final deter-
minations.6  Prior to the NAFTA, these determinations were appeala-
ble to the Court of International Trade,7 and then the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.8  Mexico and Canada were
both dissatisfied with this process due to fear of domestic political bias.
Participating countries originally reached a compromise in the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988,9 which was later implemented
nearly verbatim into the NAFTA.  This compromise stripped the Court
of International Trade and the Federal Circuit’s review power, and
placed jurisdiction exclusively in a binational panel.10
The case of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Board11 looms large while analyzing the Appointments
and Removal Clause of Article II of the Constitution.  In that case, the
Supreme Court provided further guidance on how officers are classi-
fied and, in addition, struck down the manner in which officers were
removed.  As this case plays a pivotal role in comparing the Appoint-
ments and Removal Clause to the binational panels of the NAFTA, a
full review is necessary.
Appellants,12 Free Enterprise Fund (“the Fund”), received a
critical report by Appellees, Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (“the Board”), regarding the Fund’s auditing practices.13  The
critical report triggered a deeper investigation by the Board into the
Fund’s practices.14  With the investigation and looming possibility of
severe penalties, the Fund brought a declaratory judgment action
claiming that the Board is unconstitutional, and sought an injunction
5 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2).
6 19 U.S.C. § 1673(e).
7 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1)(D) (1988) (“[A]n interested party who is a party to the
proceeding in connection with which the matter arises may commence an action in
the United States Court of International Trade by filing concurrently a summons
and complaint . . . contesting any factual findings or legal conclusion upon which
the determination is based.”).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1988) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision
of the United States Court of International Trade.”).
9 MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: HOW THE
DEAL WAS DONE 6 (2000).
10 NAFTA ch.19 (1993).
11 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bo., 130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010).
12 “The Fund” is actually a mix of two different groups: Beckstead and Watts, LLP
(an accounting firm that received the critical report from the Board) and the Free
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to prevent the Board from exercising its investigative powers.15  A look
into how the Board operates is necessary to understand the Fund’s
argument.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the Board to help reign in the
wildly volatile financial sector in the aftermath of Enron and other
questionable financial practices.16  The reach of the Board is broad: all
accounting firms, domestic and foreign, that wanted to be a part of the
American financial industry were required to register with the
Board.17  In doing so, those that were registered were subject to the
Board’s rules.18  Additionally, all firms paid a fee directly to the
Board.19
The five individual board members20 serve five-year staggered
terms21 and are appointed by commissioners of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”).22  Together,  the commissioners enforce
the rules in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the rules the SEC promulgates,
the rules the Board itself imposes, and professional accounting and au-
diting standards.23  In addition to enforcing the above rules, the Board
promulgates its own auditing and ethical standards and performs rou-
tine inspections of the registered firms.24  If one of the registered firms
fails to abide by any of the rules, the Board can hand down a steep
penalty.  A willful violation of a Board rule is considered a willful vio-
lation of an SEC rule, and is therefore a felony punishable by 20 years
in prison or $25 million dollars in fines.25  Lastly, and arguably most
importantly, only the SEC can remove Board members, and only for
good cause.26
The heart of the case, and the Fund’s key argument, rested
with the way the Board members and the SEC commissioners were
appointed and removed.  Ultimately, the Court latched onto the way
the Board members were removed.27  Because the Board members  are
only removable by SEC commissioners for good cause, and SEC com-
missioners are removable by the President only under a Humphrey’s
15 Id.
16 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2010).
17 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147
18 Id. at 3147-48.
19 Id. at 3147.
20 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(1).
21 Id. § 7211(e)(5).
22 Id. § 7211(e)(4).
23 Id. §§ 7215(b)(1), (c)(4).
24 Id. §§ 7213–14.
25 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148.
26 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6).
27 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148–49.
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Executor28 standard, a dual-level removal cloud exists.29  The exis-
tence of both standards means neither the President nor the SEC com-
missioners have direct control over the Board members.30  Because the
SEC cannot remove a Board member at will, the President cannot hold
the Commission accountable for the Board’s behavior.31  The President
can only act when he so disagrees with the Commissioners’ determina-
tion of good cause that its unreasonableness reaches the Humphrey’s
standard.32
Therefore the Court concluded that the Board operates under a
dual-level of good cause removal, which directly conflicts  with the con-
stitution’s separation of powers.33  Although in dicta, the Court stated,
“While we need not decide the question here, a removal standard ap-
propriate for limiting government control over private bodies may be
inappropriate for officers wielding the executive power of the United
States.”34
Although the Fund raised an additional challenge to the Board
using the Appointments clause, the Court found it without merit.35
The main challenge under the Appointments clause was that the
Board members were principal officers and therefore the President
was required to seek the advice and consent of the Senate prior to ap-
pointing the members.36  While the Court rejected the Fund’s argu-
ment and determined that the Board Members were not principal
officers, they did so only after stating that the SEC Commissioners,
because of the opinion, possessed the ability to remove Board Members
at will in order to avoid violating the Constitution.37  Therefore, the
Court left open the possibility that had there existed only a single level
of removal for Board Members - a higher one than an at-will standard -
the Board Members would be considered principal officers.  As such
they would have been subject to Presidential appointment with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.38 Nevertheless, the holding of the case
was limited to the removal procedures only.39
28 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1) (finding that a Commissioner may only be removed by the President for ineffi-
ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office).
29 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151.
30 Id. at 3154.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 3151.
34 Id. at 3158.
35 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. at 3162.
36 U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cl. 2; id. at 3162.
37 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162.
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164.
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The impact of this decision has the potential to reach the bina-
tional panels of NAFTA.  As discussed below, the way panel members
are selected and removed may follow the Court’s reasoning in Free En-
terprise Fund and therefore could be unconstitutional.
I. BINATIONAL PANEL SYSTEM
Binational panels decide whether an administrative determi-
nation was correct under the laws of the country that rendered it.40
The panel may remand for further proceedings consistent with its deci-
sion.41  The panel’s decision is generally binding and non-reviewable,
with one exception for an “extraordinary challenge.”42  These qualities
are judicial in nature, and the non-reviewability factor essentially
makes the binational panel the court of last resort.43
Binational panels are made up of five members selected from a
75-person roster.44  Similar to arbitration, the parties themselves de-
velop the roster with each selecting two panelists subject to challenge
by the opposing party.  The parties then agree on a fifth panelist to-
gether, or, if an agreement is not possible, they select the fifth panelist
by lot.45  The chairperson and a majority of the panel must be lawyers,
but there is no requirement that all panelists be lawyers.46  The
NAFTA encourages the use of judges, or former judges, to the extent
practicable.47  It should be noted that panel review is not mandatory.48
In fact, if a party does not request a panel review, the determination
may proceed through the judicial review procedures that apply. Due to
the generally high dollar amounts at stake and perceived bias in do-
mestic judicial review processes, failure to request a review panel is
unlikely.  When review panels are requested, they should apply the
same substantive law that the agency has applied.
40 See NAFTA arts. 1902(1), 1904, 1911.
41 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A) (1994).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 NAFTA Annex 1901.2(1-3).
45 NAFTA Annex 1901.2(3).
46 NAFTA Annex 1901.2(2).
47 NAFTA Annex 1901.2(1).
48 NAFTA art. 1903(3); see generally Ontario Forest Industries Assoc. v. United
States, 444 F. Supp.2d 1309, 1313 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006).
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II. CHALLENGING BINATIONAL PANELS
No court in the U.S. will review any decision made by either a
binational panel or an extraordinary panel.49 The only challenge that
is justifiable is a constitutional challenge to the binational panel itself.
Such a challenge must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia within thirty days of the panel’s deci-
sion.50  A decision by the D.C. Circuit may be appealed to the United
States Supreme Court within ten days of issuance.51  This procedure
has only been used twice since the implementation of binational
panels under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988.52  The
lack of challenges to the binational panel, and the fact that the two
aforementioned cases never reached a decision on the merits, are
likely due to the multiple hurdles that have been placed in the path of
a potential challenger.  Numerous obstacles negate any motivation for
a party seeking to challenge the constitutionality of this quasi-judicial
procedure.
The first obstacle is a financial one.  Constitutional disputes
are pricey in general, but prospective challengers might hesitate
before requesting review of a binational panel’s decision when faced
with the possibility of paying the opposing party’s fees as well as their
own.  The NAFTA requires the petitioning party to pay their oppo-
nent’s litigation costs if the challenge fails.53  While the court has dis-
cretion as to whether to utilize this provision, the very existence of
such a possibility is likely to discourage many companies from pursu-
ing a challenge.  The second obstacle is a dual-threat hurdle from the
executive and legislative branches.  In 1989, President Ronald Reagan
49 Ontario Forest Industries Assoc., 444 F. Supp.2d at 1313 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006)
(citing NAFTA arts. 1904(11), (13); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2)); see also NAFTA an-
nex 1904.13.
50 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(C) (“[W]ithin 30 days after the date of publication in the
Federal Register of notice that binational panel review has been completed, an
interested party who is a party to the proceeding in connection with which the
matter arises may commence an action . . . by filing an action in accordance with
the rules of the [District of Columbia Circuit] court.”).
51 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(H) (“[A]ny final judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which is issued pursuant to an action
brought under subparagraph (A) shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Su-
preme Court of the United States . . . within 10 days after such order is entered.”).
52 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 21, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27
I.L.M. 281.
53 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(F)(ii) (1994) (“[i]f a court upholds the constitutionality
of the determination in question in such action, the court shall award to a prevail-
ing party fees and expenses, in addition to any costs incurred by that party, unless
the court finds that the position of the other party was substantially justified or
that special circumstances make an award unjust.”).
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issued an executive order providing that the President accepts “as a
whole, all decisions of binational panels and extraordinary challenge
committees.”54  The President may also direct the Commerce Depart-
ment to take action consistent with the panel decision, even if the
binational panels are held unconstitutional.55
This combination of congressional and executive action essen-
tially make a constitutional challenge, even if successful, useless to the
parties involved in the case.  The only reason for such a challenge
would be to put an end to or to amend the binational panel process in
future disputes because the result in the underlying case would not
change.  When the financial and practical obstacles are combined, it
becomes apparent that constitutional challenges will be rare.  These
factors were likely central considerations to the settlements that pre-
vented the only two challenges thus far from reaching a decision on the
merits.  Regardless of the practicality of a constitutional challenge,
there are many questions that should be answered regarding bina-
tional panels.  The next three sections will discuss possible constitu-
tional violations in detail.
III. DUE PROCESS
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . .”56  As interpreted, this phrase forbids
the deprivation of a property interest by government action without
the opportunity to be heard by a neutral and detached decision-
maker.57  In 1970, the Supreme Court of the United States outlined a
four-prong analysis for due process challenges.58  First, the challenger
must establish that the action was performed under the direction or
control of the government.  Second, the challenger must prove that a
life, liberty, or property interest is affected.  Third, the challenger
must establish what process is due.  Finally, the challenger must prove
that the government, or its instrumentality, has not provided such
process.59  Under this test, it is likely that the NAFTA’s binational
panel system violates due process.
54 Exec. Order No. 12,662, 54 Fed. Reg. 785 (Jan. 9, 1989).
55 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(B). Prior to Executive Order, Congress implemented the
NAFTA which provided for the President to accept binational decisions, even if
they are held unconstitutional.
56 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
57 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976) (regarding termination of
Social Security benefits).
58 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (involving the question of whether
welfare recipient’s interest in continued receipt of welfare was a property interest
requiring due process before termination).
59 Id.
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Binational panels perform a judicial function typically reserved
for the federal judiciary under Article III.60  Binational panels “are en-
dowed by the State” through 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g), thus their “func-
tions [are] governmental in nature, they [have] become [an] agenc[y] or
instrumentalit[y] of the State and subject to its constitutional limita-
tions.”61  Likewise, a “sufficiently close nexus” exists between the
United States Government and the binational panel system, such that
the actions of binational panels are government actions for due process
purposes.62  The nexus is the finality and binding nature that panel
decisions have on the executive branch of the U.S. Government.  In
essence, binational panels are interpreting law, a judicial function,
and enforcing law, an executive function.  For these reasons, the first
prong of the due process analysis is met, and an action by a binational
panel should be considered government action.  Next, it must be deter-
mined whether a property interest is affected.
“Property interests . . . are not created by the Constitution,
[but] are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source . . . that secure
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those bene-
fits.”63  The independent source of law in this situation is the statutes
for the antidumping and countervailing duties laws.  Where a statute
creates a property interest, the Due Process clause requires that con-
stitutionally adequate procedures must be followed to alter or end that
property interest.64  In fact, on multiple occasions, the Court of Inter-
national Trade has recognized that domestic companies threatened
with material injury from dumped or subsidized imports have a prop-
erty interest in the enforcement of laws and are, therefore, entitled to
procedural due process.65  Because the government has created a prop-
erty right, Congress lacks the constitutional authority to mandate the
use of a process that strips a company of that right without complying
with due process.  This analysis must determine what process a chal-
lenger is entitled to and whether the binational panel system affords
such a process.
The process that is due to a challenger is an opportunity to be
heard by impartial and unbiased decision-makers.  In certain in-
stances, the possibility of bias may render adjudication unconstitu-
60 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2).
61 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
62 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
63 Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
64 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
65 See, e.g., Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 517 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1992); PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 708 F. Supp. 1327 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1989).
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tional as a denial of due process.66  The test for bias rendering
adjudication violating due process is a situation “which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as judge . . . which might lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the [par-
ties].”67  The Supreme Court has emphasized the need for impartial
and unbiased review, even if that means that a judge with no actual
bias will be barred from hearing a case.68  The Court derives its posi-
tion from the maxim that “justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice.”69  In Matthews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court laid out balance
to this stringent rule.70  In Matthews, the Court applied a balancing
test weighing the affected private interest with the government’s in-
terest.71  The apparent government interest at play in instituting the
binational panel system is a political interest to satisfy  the govern-
ments of Canada and Mexico.  The Supreme Court has rarely found a
governmental interest sufficient to outweigh private due process
rights.  In 2004, the Court held that even national security interests
cannot outweigh the right to an impartial adjudicator.72  If national
security does not weigh enough to tip the scales, then it is doubtful
that political and pecuniary interests would weigh more.  Now that the
initial three elements have been satisfied, it must be determined
whether the binational panel system provides the process due.
Binational panels do not provide due process because the pro-
cess itself creates the possibility of bias.  Many argue that if binational
panels are unconstitutional for this reason, then all arbitrations would
suffer the same fate.  However, the compulsory nature of binational
panels noticeably distinguishes them from private arbitrations.  In pri-
vate arbitrations, both sides agree to submit to such a system in ex-
change for cost savings and to promote efficiency.  However, in the
binational panel arena, if either party demands a binational panel re-
view then both parties are required to submit to this process.73 The
possibility of bias and lack of mutual assent renders the binational
panel system unconstitutional.
In 1993, the Supreme Court heard a case that had similar con-
cerns to the binational panel system.  In Concrete Pipe and Products of
California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers, the Court noted disfavor for
any process by which the adjudicators chosen, even by private parties,
66 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
532 (1927)).
67 Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added).
68 Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
69 Id. (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
70 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 319 (1976).
71 Id. at 335.
72 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
73 NAFTA § 1904.
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had an incentive to be biased.74  The Court stressed that justice must
appear just, and that this requirement is not relaxed when a private
party has adjudicative authority by statute.75  Binational panelists
have a dual role that cannot be separated sufficiently to satisfy due
process.  On one hand, they may be biased towards the party that ap-
pointed and pays them. Likewise, the panelists are also usually from
the country of the appointing party.  On the other hand, they have
been asked to serve in a quasi-judicial, unbiased role with little to no
training in U.S. law or administrative procedure.  This inherent con-
flict of interest creates at least a possibility of bias.  Therefore, some
argue that this probability of bias makes binational panels in violation
of the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.
In addition to the generalized bias of nationality and affinity
for the appointing party, binational panelists can have both a profes-
sional and pecuniary interest in the outcome of the cases.  Professional
bias may arise because many of the panelists are trade lawyers and
consultants who currently practice before the Commerce Department
and International Trade Commission.  Thus, panelists are placed in a
position to review decisions of the agencies before which they practice.
Panelists may feel inclined to take one position because of the possible
assistance the decision could lend to their own cases or controversies.
In addition, panelists also have a personal financial interest in ensur-
ing repetitive selection by ruling in favor of the party who appointed
them in order to continue collecting fees.  If a party perceives that one
panelist seems to side with them on a regular basis, they are more
likely to choose that panelist for future disputes.  While panels are un-
likely to be filled with biased members, the Supreme Court held that a
single biased member taints the entire panel, and thus denies the
party’s due process rights.76
A sufficient process to remove potentially biased members and
guard against bias would cure this deficiency.  Unfortunately, no such
process exists under the NAFTA.  A panel member may only be re-
moved if both party-countries consent.77  The possibility that one party
could present evidence of bias and be unable to effectuate removal uni-
laterally deprives the aggrieved party of their due process right to a
neutral and detached decision-maker.  Even if the panel is completely
unbiased, the process may still violate due process by failing to provide
74 Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers, 508 U.S.
602, 617 (1993).
75 Id. at 618.
76 Amos Treat & Co. v. S.E.C., 306 F.2d 260, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (quoting Berk-
shire Employees Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 121 F.2d 235, 238-39 (3d Cir. 1941)).
77 See NAFTA Annex 1901.2(6).
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a panel that is competent to interpret and apply the United States
laws and standards of review.78
In considering the use of untrained adjudicators, the Supreme
Court upheld a Medicare review system that allowed non-lawyers to
serve as decision-makers because the Act specifically required hearing
officers to have a thorough knowledge of the Medicare program.79  No
such requirement exists under chapter 19 of the NAFTA.  In addition,
the binational panel system suffers from some other serious practical
complications.  Under the current system, Canadian lawyers are ex-
pected to interpret and apply U.S. law, and Mexican lawyers, who
come from a civil law background, are expected to act in a common law
system that is foreign to their training.  As is human nature, a panelist
who is not trained in U.S. law or its standards may focus on the out-
come and work backwards from there.  This concern has played out
before.
In at least two panel opinions, a dissenting member noted that
the majority of the panel ignored the standard of review or applicable
case law.  In In re Grey Portland Cement & Clinker From Mexico, pan-
elist Endsley noted that he feared the other panel members ignored
the standard of review and utilized a “wholesale dismissal of the appli-
cable case law.”80  In In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada, panelist Wilkey noted that the Canadian members did not
have a familiarity with the standards of judicial review and instead
proceeded to “reevaluate the evidence, [and] re-determine the techni-
cal issues” that were before the agency.81  The possibility of ignorance
of applicable law creates a process that is diametrically opposed to the
concept of due process.  The most elementary expectations for an adju-
dicator are that they have knowledge and understanding of the law or
rules to be applied.  For these reasons, the binational panel system
violates due process.
IV. ARTICLE II
Article II of the United States Constitution provides, in rele-
vant part, that the President “shall nominate . . . with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate . . . Officers of the United States, whose Ap-
pointments are not herein otherwise provided for.”82  It also provides
that the Congress may “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
78 See Gordon v. Justice Court for Yuba Judicial Dist., 525 P.2d 72, 75 (Cal. 1974)
(striking practice of non-law-trained judges presiding over criminal trials).
79 Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1982).
80 No. US-97-1904-1, 1999 FTAPD Lexis 4 at *325 (June 18, 1999).
81 1994 WL 405928 at *63-64 (August 3, 1994).
82 U.S. CONST. art. II.
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in the Heads of Departments.”83  The Supreme Court has defined “Of-
ficer of the United States” as an appointee exercising significant au-
thority pursuant to the law of the United States.84  The following
paragraphs demonstrate that binational panelists exercise such au-
thority, and that whether regarded as an “Officer” or an “inferior Of-
ficer,” their appointments contravene Article II of the United States
Constitution.
Binational panelists exercise significant authority pursuant to
the law of the United States.  They review antidumping and counter-
vailing duty determinations of other principal Officers of the United
States.  The President, with advice and consent of the Senate, appoints
the Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of the International
Trade Commission.  The panelists, however, derive their power di-
rectly from the implementing legislation of the NAFTA.85  The Su-
preme Court has never determined whether such panelists are
“Officers.”86  But, in an analogous situation, the Court determined
that the Election Commission, created to enforce compliance with cer-
tain laws, were Officers for the purpose of Article II appointments.87
The Court noted that the commissioners’ powers encroached upon the
President’s ability to faithfully execute the law.88  Also, the Court has
become highly skeptical of officers, whether principal or inferior, who
are insulated from the President.89  When such officers are handling
some form of executive business without presidential oversight, their
authority and actions contravene constitutional authority.90  Simi-
larly, binational a panelist’s authority to review the determinations of
administrative agencies encroaches upon the executive authority to
make such determinations, and possibly the judiciary’s authority to re-
view such determinations.  It is unreasonable that an officer should be
subject to the binding review of a non-officer.  Another major problem
is the lack of control or direction by any of the three constitutional
branches.91  As discussed, this problem was at issue in Free Enterprise
Fund, where Board Members, only controllable by the President
through a dual-layer of good-cause removal, had the ability to dole out
fines, force registration with the payment of a fee, and enforce specific
procedures and protocol for an entire sector.92  The Court held that the
83 Id.
84 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
85 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A).
86 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 141.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151.
90 Id.
91 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
92 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151.
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amount of power the Board Members wielded coupled with the level of
insulation they enjoyed was unconstitutional.93
Binational panelists are required to apply the laws of the
United States, utilizing standards of review developed by the Ameri-
can judiciary whose decisions have binding authority over administra-
tive agencies.  Because the panelists exercise their authority pursuant
to United States law, they are “Officers” of the United States.  The fact
that panelists are only selected for a single case at a time does not
remove them from the purview of the Appointments Clause.  While du-
ration is a factor to be considered, no single factor is determinative.94
Authority exists for “Officers” who are only appointed for a single case.
The Supreme Court has held that Independent Counsels, appointed
for a single case, are subject to the requirements of the Appointments
Clause.95  While Independent Counsels were determined to be inferior
officers, the following paragraphs explain why the current process for
the selection of binational panelists violates the Appointments Clause,
regardless of whether they are considered principal or inferior
Officers.
The President selects Principal Officers with the advice and
consent of the Senate; while inferior Officers, if Congress allows, may
be appointed by the President alone, by the head of a department, or
by the Judiciary.96  Recently, the Supreme Court expanded the scope
of those that may appoint inferior officers.97  Now, the term, “head of a
department” can be considered to include an entire commission of peo-
ple, so long as they generally share responsibilities with each other.98
Specifically, the Court stated, “As a constitutional matter, we see no
reason why a multi-member body may not be the ‘Hea[d]’ of a
‘Departmen[t]’ that it governs.”99  Here, however, a single entity does
not select binational panelists.  In fact, the governments of Canada or
Mexico select some of the panelists, while the United States Trade
Representative appoints the rest.100  Obviously, the panelists are not
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  If panelists
are determined to be principal Officers, then this deficiency would
make their appointment unconstitutional.  If it is assumed that panel-
ists are more accurately characterized as inferior Officers, then they
93 Id.
94 See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
95 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988).
96 Id. at 670.
97 Even recently, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of those who may
appoint officers. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 918 (1991).
98 Free  Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162.
99 Id. at 3163.
100 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
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still fail to pass constitutional muster.  The United States Trade Rep-
resentative is not the President, a head of a department, or the Judici-
ary.101  The appointment of panelists by foreign governments is in no
way reconcilable with the mandates of the Appointments Clause.  As
Justice Scalia noted in a 1994 case, “violations of the Appointments
Clause occurs . . . when Congress . . . effectively lodges appointment
power in any person other than those whom the Constitution
specifies.”102
Congress granted panelists the authority to make binding deci-
sions regarding administrative determinations.  The Founding Fa-
thers established the Appointments Clause to prevent this type of
delegation.103  If panelists are principal Officers, the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, should have the sole power to
appoint.104  If panelists are inferior Officers, the President, the head of
a department, or the Judiciary should appoint them.105  The Constitu-
tion, in no way, gives foreign powers the authority to appoint panel-
ists.  For these reasons, the current selection process for binational
panelists violates the Appointments Clause.
In addition, should it be determined that panelists exercise ex-
ecutive rather than judicial powers, the panels violate the requirement
of a unitary executive branch.  Article II requires that the President
personally, and through officers accountable to him, ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.106  Executive authority may be delegated,
but must ultimately be delegated to Officers or agencies that are still
subject to the President’s control.107  In Printz v. United States, the
Court held that the President was not allowed to force local law en-
forcement officers to perform background checks on handgun purchas-
ers because the act unconstitutionally delegated executive power
beyond the President’s control.108  Under the binational panel system,
private citizens are selected to exercise, arguably, executive powers
outside the control of the President.  Similarly, the Supreme Court
101 See 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (stipulating that departments of the United States
are identified by statute, and the applicable statute does not include the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative).
102 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 196 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
103 U.S CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
104 If panelists are determined to be principal Officers, this deficiency would make
their appointment unconstitutional.  If it is assumed that panelists are more accu-
rately characterized as inferior Officers, they still fail to pass constitutional mus-
ter. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919.
105 If it is assumed that panelists are more accurately characterized as inferior
Officers, they still fail to pass constitutional muster. Id.
106 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
107 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997).
108 Id. at 922-23.
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struck down legislation giving the force of law to regulatory codes de-
veloped by industry associations.109  The Court noted that the delega-
tion to industry associations “is legislative delegation in its most
obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official
body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose inter-
ests may be, and often are, adverse to the interest of others in the
same business.”110  As previously noted, the panelists’ private inter-
ests may be adverse to the parties involved in the case before them.
Thus, the inability of the executive branch to control or review bina-
tional panel decisions violates the mandate for a unitary executive.111
In Free Enterprise Fund, it was the President’s inability to directly
control the Board Members that led to its unconstitutionality.112  The
court stated, “Without such power, the President could not be held
fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities; the buck
would stop somewhere else.”113  Executive control over officers is un-
questionably inherent in the Constitution.
The NAFTA implementing legislation delegates power to de-
cide matters pursuant to United States law to panels unaccountable to
the executive branch and the American people.  This delegation is in-
consistent with both the Constitution and American democracy.114
While the binational panel system does not include accountability to
the United States government as required by the Constitution, it does
include accountability to foreign countries at some level.115 If the deci-
sions are not attributable to the United States government because of
the constitutional shortcomings, then they are analogous to a foreign
judgment.  The Supreme Court has determined that foreign judgments
are not controlling in United States with respect to the Supreme
Court’s interpretation and application of the 8th Amendment.116  It
appears that the binational panel system violates both the Appoint-
ments Clause and the requirement of a unitary executive under Article
II of the United States Constitution.
In addition to the Appointments Clause, the NAFTA binational
panels violate the Removal Clause as illustrated by Free Enterprise
109 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
110 Id. at 311.
111 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan-
ama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding that the President’s reten-
tion of the power to decide whether to give binding legal effect to trade, state, or
council determinations was not enough to validate the delegation of such power
under the National Industrial Recovery Act).
112 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164.
113 Id.
114 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537.
115 NAFTA arts. 1902.1, 1904, 1911.
116 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
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Fund.117 The Constitution has charged the President with the duty to
“Take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”118  To do so, the Presi-
dent is vested with the power to remove the officers that help him
carry out the duties he has been charged with.119  And, while there
have been limits placed on this presidential power,120 these limits,
with respect to the binational panels of the NAFTA, contravene the
Constitution.
As noted above, the panelists serving on binational panels are
appointed from different countries.  The analysis above demonstrates
that the appointment of those panelists is unconstitutional.  However,
just as the President lacks the power to appoint, he also lacks the
power to remove the panelists, making their existence unconstitu-
tional, again.  Well-stated constitutional law affirms that the Presi-
dent holds the authority to remove officers working for the executive
department.121  And, while the Court stated in Humphrey’s Executor
that Congress may restrict the President’s removal power by requiring
him to show “for-cause”, it only mattered when the officer was consid-
ered a hybrid, meaning he possessed some form of multiple branch
characteristics, rather than purely executive.122
When it comes to the binational panels of the NAFTA, the
President lacks the constitutionally protected power of removing of-
ficers.  If the panelists are considered purely executive officers, the
President should have the ability to remove for whatever reason.  Even
if the panelists are considered quasi-branch officers, as those illus-
trated in Humphrey’s Executor, the President may be restricted to a
for-cause standard.123 The panelists, however, irrespective of status
(quasi or pure) or nationality (American, Canadian, or Mexican), are
not removable by the President.124  This means that the President has
no authority – whether for-cause or not – to fulfill his constitutional
duty and ensure the laws of the United States are followed and exe-
cuted.  In essence, a panelist from a different nation may contribute to
a ruling that binds a party from the United States without that panel-
ist being accountable to any government agent in the United States of
America.
In Free Enterprise Fund, an analogous situation regarding the
President’s removal powers of inferior officers was at issue.125 The of-
117 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.Ct. at 3151.
118 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
119 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 57 (1926).
120 See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 602; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
121 Id.
122 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 602.
123 Id.
124 NAFTA arts. 1901.2, 2011.
125 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151.
2011] THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 541
ficers in Free Enterprise Fund were protected by a dual for-cause re-
moval standard, meaning they could only be removed for-cause by
their superiors, SEC Commissioners, who, in turn, were also only re-
movable by the President for-cause.126 While Congress has been able
to insulate officers to a degree, the Court held, creating a dual for-
cause protection crossed the constitutionally allowed threshold.127
The double level of insulation took control away from the President,
even in the decision of whether good cause existed or not.128  The
Court noted that one level of for-cause protection has been upheld in
the past, but that double protection constructed a denial of the ability
to hold any of the SEC Commissioners accountable.  Even the SEC
lacked the ability to remove the Board Members at-will.129  Therefore,
nobody, including the President, could be held accountable for the ac-
tions of the Board Members.130  The lack of accountability, a constitu-
tional staple for the Executive Branch, was being contravened.
The same lack of accountability in Free Enterprise Fund is pre-
sent in the NAFTA binational panels.  As outlined above, the Presi-
dent is charged with the duty of executing the laws of the United
States.131 Because of this, he is accountable and responsible to the peo-
ple he governs.  Therefore, the President needs the ability to run the
Executive Branch as he sees fit and this includes removing officers if
he desires.  However, the NAFTA binational panels eviscerate the
President’s ability to execute this responsibility.  If the President dis-
agrees with a panelist’s ruling, he lacks the requisite power to remove
the panelist, even if the panelist hails from a foreign nation.
Furthermore, the people affected by a decision handed down
from the binational panels have no one to hold accountable for the
positioning of the panelists.  They cannot blame a member of Con-
gress, a department head, or the President.  Instead, the panelists en-
joy an independent source of protection because no superior officer can
remove them, either at will or for cause.132 Therefore, the binational
panelists lack any removal procedure typical for officers of the United
States.  In Free Enterprise Fund the Court struck down a dual-level of
protection.133 When it comes to the binational panels of the NAFTA,
multiple levels of protection exist, leading to an utter lack of accounta-
bility.  The President’s inability to remove these officers directly con-
flicts with the Constitution.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 3151.
128 Id. at 3153.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
132 NAFTA art. 1902(1).
133 See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151.
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V. ARTICLE III
The total divestiture and preclusion of review by Article III
courts makes the binational panel system inherently unconstitutional.
Prior to the invention of the binational panel system, antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations of the Commerce Department
were subject to review by the Court of International Trade, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and possibly the Supreme Court of
the United States.134  After the implementation of the binational panel
system, however, the panels have the authority to interpret United
States law and direct the actions of administrative agencies without
any meaningful oversight.135  This lack of oversight, or even a modi-
cum of judicial review, should render the process unconstitutional.
Whatever power Congress has to parse out adjudicatory duties, al-
lowing possibly biased non-governmental panels to interpret and apply
United States law, without any judicial oversight, falls outside the
province of its authority.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the decisions of bina-
tional panels are “binding, and domestic judicial review of panel deter-
minations is prohibited.”136  A jurisprudential examination of the
history of Congressional delegations of adjudicatory powers reveals
that while review may be limited, it may not be wholly abandoned.
For example, in a 1982 plurality opinion, the Supreme Court allowed
Congress to delegate authority over bankruptcy litigation from Article
III district courts to the newly formed bankruptcy courts.137  It is note-
worthy that the Court reached this decision partially because the liti-
gant has an appeal as of right to an Article III court.138  The Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. decision created
an exception for matters considered functions of the executive or legis-
lative departments.139  While this appeared to be a bright line rule, it
was short lived.
In 1985, the Supreme Court refused to follow any bright line
rules and instead, upheld Congress’s attempt to transfer adjudicatory
power from the Environmental Protection Agency to a body of arbitra-
tors.140  The Court approved use of a balancing test to comply with the
mandates of Article III.141  When applying the balancing test, the
134 Id.
135 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7).
136 American Coal. for Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
137 Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
138 Id. at 55.
139 Id. at 63-68.
140 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985).
141 See id. at 587.
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Court pointed out the significance of some judicial review, to review
arbitrators’ decisions for fraud, misconduct or misrepresentation.142
Specifically, the Court noted that such review protects against “arbi-
trators who abuse or exceed their powers or willfully misconstrue their
mandate under the governing law.”143  The binational panel system’s
failure to provide even this modicum of protection for litigants possibly
renders the system unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court further refined the balancing test in 1986
when the  Court upheld Congress’s delegation of adjudicatory power to
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).144  In Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court noted that
the plaintiff waived his right to Article III review  by voluntarily sub-
mitting his claim to the CFTC.145  In contrast, the NAFTA binational
panel system is not voluntary.146 If either party wishes to remove the
claim from traditional Article III review, the case is transferred to the
binational panel.147  Thus, an opposing party’s request for binational
review overrides the plaintiff’s choice to submit his claim to a court.
The Supreme Court noted in dicta that removing all review
would be unconstitutional.148  In addition, several circuit courts have
acknowledged some form of judicial review is fundamental to an Arti-
cle III analysis.149  By contrast, the binational panel system provides
no judicial review.150  Neither the international concerns at play, nor
the nature of the law in dispute, should allow Congress to summarily
preclude all judicial review because such preclusion violates Article
III.151  It is also worth noting that Union Carbide involved the transfer
of power from one non-Article III institution to another, while still pre-
serving judicial review by an Article III court.152  However, the imple-
mentation of the binational panel system transferred authority from
142 Id. at 592.
143 Id.
144 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986).
145 Id. at 849.
146 NAFTA § 1904(1).
147 NAFTA § 1904(5).
148 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 n.23 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 n.13 (1977)).
149 See Chemical Bank v. Togut (In re Axona Int’l Credit), 924 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.
1991); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Parklane/Atlanta Venture (In re Parklane/Atlanta
Joint Venture), 927 F.2d 532, 538 (11th Cir. 1991); Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper &
Cooper, Ltd., 889 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1989); Marozsan v. United States, 852
F.2d 1469, 1472 (7th Cir. 1988).
150 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A).
151 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 43 F.3d 682, 689-90
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
152 Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 571.
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an Article III court, the Court of International Trade, to arbitrators in
a non-Article III institution without any oversight by the government
whose laws they are to interpret and apply.153  Because Schor is still
the applicable law in an Article III analysis, it is necessary to examine
the factors the Court considered in their balancing test.
The factors for consideration are:
(1) the extent to which the essential attributes of judicial
power are reserved to Article III courts; (2) the extent to
which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of ju-
risdiction and powers normally vested only in the Article
III courts; (3) the origins and importance of the right to
be adjudicated; and (4) the concerns that drove Congress
to depart from the requirements of Article III.154
Although no individual factor is determinative, many courts view the
first factor as dominant in their analysis.155  This dominant factor,
however, is non-existent in the binational panel system, further tilting
the balancing scales toward unconstitutionality.
The second factor, the extent to which the non-Article III forum
exercises traditional Article III functions, likewise contributes to the
constitutional demise of the binational panel system.  As Chief Justice
John Marshall noted, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”156  Congress did not ad-
here to this precedent when it gave binational panels’ unfettered au-
thority to interpret, apply, and render decisions regarding the laws of
the United States without the possibility of judicial oversight.  Panel
members also engage in judicial activities, such as entertaining mo-
tions, reviewing legal memoranda, and hearing oral arguments.157  It
appears that binational panelists are serving in a judicial role that is
clearly within the province of Article III, and thus, the second factor
also weighs against the constitutionality of the binational panel
system.
Third, the process does not invoke the public rights exception.
Antidumping and countervailing duty questions do not involve the
government as a party, but two private companies.158  While govern-
153 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(7)(A).
154 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
155 See Spierer v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Dep’t Stores), 328
F.3d 829, 835-36 (6th Cir. 2003); Public Citizen  v. Burke, 843 F.2d 1473, 1479 n.8
(D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1331 (2d Cir. 1988).
156 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
157 See NAFTA arts. 1904(7), (14).
158 Leon E. Trakman, Address before the 25th Australian International Trade
Law Conference 2003 Resolving Trade Disputes: Learning from the NAFTA 4–5
n.15 (1997), http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(1E76C1DSD1A3
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mental presence is not mandatory, it is a nearly dispositive factor.159
Even if the right were somehow styled as a ‘public right’, the nature of
the right is not dispositive in an Article III analysis.160  Even if it is
conceded that this factor weighs in favor of the binational panel sys-
tem, the other factors still substantially outweigh it.
Finally, Congress has historically departed from the mandates
of Article III to reduce the burdens on their dockets, and created Arti-
cle I courts with specialized areas of expertise.161  Prior to the imple-
mentation of the binational panel system, the reverse had occurred
because the cases were decided by a specialized Article III court that
was well versed in United States trade law, and was one of the most
efficient Federal courts in the country.162  After a consideration of the
factors, it is clear that the binational panel system not only fails the
balancing test, but also struggles to provide any constitutional weight
in favor of the system.  Therefore, the binational panel system violates
Article III of the Constitution of the United States.  As discussed in the
next section, there are only two instances in which this procedure has
been formally challenged on a constitutional basis.  Although neither
case reached a decision on the merits, their presentation and posture
are instructive in our consideration of this subject.
VI. CASES
The first case to challenge the constitutionality of the bina-
tional panel system of the NAFTA was filed in 1997.163  The American
Coalition of Competitive Trade (“ACCT”), a non-profit organization,
brought suit claiming injury through its respective members who lost
their jobs due to adverse binational panel decisions.164  ACCT con-
tended that the binational panel system infringed upon United States
sovereignty by violating the Appointments Clause, Article III, and the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.165  Unfortu-
nately, the court refused to address the merits of the case and dis-
missed the action due to lack of Article III standing.166  The ACCT’s
7992FDBOC1C4DB87942E)~Trakman+ITLC+paper+revised+MAZ.Doc/$file/Trak
man+ITLC+paper+revised+MAZ.DOC.
159 See Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 586.
160 Schor, 478 U.S. at 853.
161 See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936–37 (1991); Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 398 (1973).
162 Ethan Boyer, Article III, the Foreign Relations Power, and the Binational
Panel System of NAFTA, 13 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 101, 113–14 (1996).
163 See American Coal. for Competitive Trade, 128 F. 3d at 761.
164 Id. at 763.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 765–67.
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failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the NAFTA
also served as the basis for the adverse finding.167
It took nearly ten years for the next constitutional challenge to
occur.  In 2006, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports challenged the
constitutionality of the binational panel systems contained in both the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA.168  Once again,
the system was challenged for violation of Article II, Article III, and
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.169  The par-
ties settled their dispute, however, after oral argument and deprived
the court of jurisdiction the opportunity to decide the case.170  The ex-
act reasons for the settlement have never been disclosed, although it
may have been to avoid unraveling the NAFTA, to avoid further litiga-
tion costs if the decision was later appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, or because the Coalition received favorable terms
for settlement.  What is clear is that the settlement has once again
raised constitutional suspicion of the binational panel system without
the satisfaction of a definitive answer.
CONCLUSION
Binational panels, comprised of members untrained in United
States law, are ill equipped to interpret and enforce the laws of the
United States.  While similar to private arbitration, the process is
flawed because it requires private companies to waive their right to
judicial determination without due process.  The financial and practi-
cal hurdles that potential challengers face clearly exist to discourage
opposition to an institution that direly needs exactly that.  At the very
least, every adjudicator should be expected to know and understand
the applicable laws and rules.  The possibility, or probability, that
members cannot adequately apply United States law demonstrates the
reality that the binational panel system violates the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution.  Regardless of whether the
panel members are determined to be principal or inferior officers, the
current process violates the Appointments and Removal Clause.  If
panel members wield executive powers, then the current process vio-
lates the requirement of a unitary executive.  Considering the Schor
factors, it is apparent that the binational panel system not only fails
the balancing test, but also struggles to provide any constitutional
weight in favor of the system, violating Article III as well.  For these
167 Id. at 766–67.
168 See Coal. for Fair Labor Imps. Exec. Comm. v. United States, 471 F. 3d 1329,
1330 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
169 Brief of Petitioner at 46, 53, Coal. for Fair Lumber Imps. Exec. Comm. v.
United States, No. 05-1366 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 17, 2006).
170 Id. at 1332-33.
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reasons,  the next challenger of the binational system should possess
the required standing, the perseverance to attain a decision on the
merits, and the financial resources to promote the greater good, be-
cause he will not receive any immediate benefit.
